"Proceed."

"Treaties of this sort are not directly binding on this Court, but they are still law. In a case like this one, where there is a separate cause of action, they can be invoked and should be considered even when not given direct effect. Colloquially speaking, it should nudge the Court to err on the side of fulfilling the purpose of the treaty. I agree that if there were a hard rule that Good violated, that would be a separate action."

"To be clear, giving treaties that kind of consideration is a valid position commonly advanced in academic legal circles. Whether it is actually true is an open question, and has been judicially described as "confounding." In re Postal, 2862."

"And whatever the Court's position on that debate, this is not the case to settle it. It is clear that there is no requirement to consider the treaties Hell refers to, let alone sift through argument on whether they are implicated. We do have an entirely separate case of first impression to resolve."

"And what other case should we wait for? Questions with settled answers already have settled answers. The ones breaking new ground, like this, are the ones where guidance from outside authority may be useful. By your logic, the question of whether courts should consider treaties in their decisions will simply remain open."

"Indeed. This may be why it has remained confounding since 2862."

"Not to interrupt you Lawful types, but does any of this... matter?

By my count, you are literally talking through whether to argue to the Court about which way it should resolve an existing argument on what kinds of rules you can argue about when you finally get back to this case. Personally, I'm human, and humans were never meant to count that high.

Even if you all have genes that belong wherever Law comes from."

"Elysium makes a strong point. The impact on the Malediction or soul-sale treaties is certainly not going to make very much difference to this case, and we have plenty of actual actions and motives to look at.  Unless Hell has an argument that it might be dispositive, let's return to actions more specific to the decedent."

"Of course, Your Honor. I'd only ask the Court to keep in mind the effect of the decedent's actions on existing diplomatic agreements when deciding close questions. If the Court believes there are any.

As to the Good and Evil of the decedent specifically, Hell continues to state primarily that he dedicated his entire career to an action that is Evil because it is anathema to Pharasma, and secondarily that developing the spell is Evil because the mere fact of it being available would have substantial Evil effects.

I do feel I'm beginning to repeat myself, but no party has argued that Pharasma approves of dodging Her courts, or even that She does not disapprove. The closest any party has come to a counterargument is mitigation-- that it was done with the Good effects in mind. But Harrow knew, like everyone knows, that avoiding this judgment is forbidden. He acted with "conscious disregard or indifference" toward that Evil, which is an Evil mental state according to too many cases to count.  And he dedicated his life to spreading that Evil as far as possible."

"Good and Evil aren't just what Pharasma says. It's about other people. There are cases for this going back to in re Euthyphro, and it's why the Court opens each trial by confirming that the decedent was aware of the effect on other people. Not whether they're aware that Pharasma has opinions on things. And the effect on other people does count in Harrow's favor here.

This isn't just some defense where he had Good in him deep down. It's a Good act, for Good reasons, and Hell thinks he should be damned for it."

"First of all, Hell objects. We're not "damning" anybody. And Nirvana isn't defending him, and nothing counts in his favor. Or against him, for that matter. Under Downside v. K--"

"Wrong jurisdiction, dicta, and I believe it's been overturned."

"Fine. Under In re Crouse, if you prefer, this Court's duty is to assign each party to the "proper place." It's not an adversarial proceeding, it's not about what they've earned or deserve, and there is no prosecution or defense side. Nirvana is free to attempt arguing that Harrow is Neutral Good, but no party here represents him."

"Yes, I'll remind the advocates that there is no for or against in this trial, only a fitting or unfitting sorting based on his actions and character while alive.

That said, any such misstatements will not affect the judgment."

"Thank you, Your Honor.

Second, Nirvana is once again asserting that there was Good in the decedent's motivation. Hell does not contest that his motives were partly Good. Mixed with Evil, to the extent it matters; he chose this career partly because he accumulated plenty of personal reputation and some material gain, both of which he did value for their own sake. But most importantly, the actual action he chose was Evil. Pharasma does not have opinions, She has decrees. Our task is to identify those decrees and follow them to the best of our ability.

Yes, there was some Good in his motives. And if Hell relied purely on the likely effects, that would be the correct type of counterargument. Even if not enough of one to outweigh the increased number of sold souls as the price plummets and Evil-doers who expect a way out are willing to sell for a much smaller fraction of Hell's permitted budget of intervention in the mortal world, the sharp increase in willingness to do Evil by everyone especially the powerful, and the defunding of half the Good churches. The decedent consciously disregarded those risks.

But most importantly, he embarked on a deliberate attempt to divert more souls away from this tower than anyone has done since Abaddon first raided the River of Souls. While knowing that the judgement is decreed and intervening was forbidden. He's Evil."

"Any increased number of sold souls is first of all purely speculative--"

"Expert declarations in support, from experts affiliated with the churches of Asmodeus and Abadar, as well as the relevant department of Hell."

(Only Axis bothers to accept the offered copy. The pages levitate to form a mosaic ceiling above the rotating wheel, and when it reads the documents it gives the impression of rolling rather a lot of eyes.)

"--and secondly irrelevant. Harrow is not responsible for other, unrelated Evil actions that other people may do. Unlike the Benediction itself, where arranging for the action was his specific goal, here we're talking about choices that other persons had the last clear chance to make or avoid. Even if the perceived risk of selling souls goes down, every other mortal still has the option of not selling.

The existence of Benediction would not cause, force, or encourage potential sellers to make such a deal, nor would it increase the Evil in the act of selling one's soul among those who do it. And he certainly can't be held responsible for Hell's possible response in attempting to purchase more widely."

"Of course he can. The last clear chance doctrine only applies if the later Evil-doer was unable to avoid doing Evil and the decedent had a culpable mental state in creating their situation.

In this particular case, the decedent's mental state regarding Hell's response was choosing not to think about it. And the later Evil-doer is Hell. And Devils, as we all know, do not have free will."

"What, so you can just advertise that if anyone ties their shoes you'll kill a puppy, and suddenly everyone has to go barefoot?

According to Elysium v. Hell, -4004, courts in the exercise of their discretion and the interests of substantial justice look disfavorably on bullshit."

"No, I agree that would be b- would be beyond the limits expressed in your paraphrase of Elysium v. Hell.

But that's not the same thing. Unlike your example, Hell is not planning to change its behavior for the purpose of incentivizing researchers like the decedent. I am simply saying that, if and when his project succeeds, then Hell's current policy of seeking the most souls for its limited purchase budget will obviously mean a larger number of souls at a lower price. It's obvious if you understand decision theory."

"It's still irrelevant. Even if the Court accepted Hell's creative argument regarding its own future choices, the hypothetical people who may later sell their souls definitely do have free will.

Hell is arguing that Harrow's act is Evil because it makes the tradeoff from their point of view appear less extreme. Not even that. Hell is arguing that Harrow's act is Evil because it makes the tradeoff actually be less extreme. It is true that Harrow is helping a large number of people, and that some of them might use his gift for Evil. But reducing the penalty for Evil is not the same as encouraging Evil. Or every merciful king would damn himself with each pardon."

"That can, in fact, be Evil. In re DeMonaco, 4052. Heaven is correct that this is not the normal rule; DeMonaco was a special case. But it was Evil specifically because of the breadth-- rather than forgiving something specific or making some tradeoff for which we can judge the wisdom it was a blanket permission on all Evil. DeMonaco held that it was enough to remove all temporal sanction against Evil. Here, the decedent goes further and attempts to remove it from the afterlife. All Evil would be permissible, for those who can pay."

"That is an argument for Hell's other point, about promoting Evil generally. You were arguing about increased soul sales specifically. Assuming we accept that that would become more common, creating a way out for those who have done so is at least a specific tradeoff. I propose we return to DeMonaco when it is relevant."